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ABSTRACT
Pseudonymisation provides the means to reduce the privacy impact
of monitoring, auditing, intrusion detection, and data collection
in general on individual subjects. Its application on data records,
especially in an environment with additional constraints, like re-
identification in the course of incident response, implies assump-
tions and privacy issues, which contradict the achievement of the
desirable privacy level. Proceeding from two real-world scenarios,
where personal and identifying data needs to be processed, we
identify requirements as well as a system model for pseudonymisa-
tion and explicitly state the sustained privacy threats, even when
pseudonymisation is applied. With this system and threat model,
we derive privacy protection goals together with possible technical
realisations, which are implemented and integrated into our event
pseudonymisation framework PEEPLL for the context of event pro-
cessing, like monitoring and auditing of user, process, and network
activities. Our framework provides privacy-friendly linkability in
order to maintain the possibility for automatic event correlation
and evaluation, while at the same time reduces the privacy impact
on individuals. Additionally, the pseudonymisation framework is
evaluated in order to provide some restrained insights on the impact
of assigned paradigms and all necessary new mechanisms on the
performance of monitoring and auditing. With this framework,
privacy provided by event pseudonymisation can be enhanced
by a more rigorous commitment to the concept of personal data
minimisation, especially in the context of regulatory requirements
like the European General Data Protection Regulation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Pseudonymity, anonymity and un-
traceability; Management and querying of encrypted data;
Public key encryption; Hash functions and message authentication
codes.
KEYWORDS
personal data minimisation, pseudonym re-usage, privacy pro-
tection goals, pseudonymisation framework, indistinguishability,
unobservability, limited linkability
1 INTRODUCTION
Monitoring and auditing of user, process, and network activities
plays an important role for the security of a system. By leveraging
gained information, a security operator can observe unusual
∗This paper is an extended version of work that has been accepted for publication in
the proceedings of the 35th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium On Applied Computing, 2020.
behaviour and possibly detect or even prevent past and ongoing
attacks on his system. The success of such an analysis requires
as much information about the actions in the system as possible.
However, it also has severe privacy implications. Each data record
might not only contain directly or indirectly identifying attributes of
a person, like names or addresses, but also IP addresses, unique user
ids, or account data. Such data is called personal data [1, Article 4(1)]
or quasi identifier (QIDs) [2] and comprises directly identifying
as well as potentially identifying features, i.e., attributes that are
by themselves not sufficient to identify individuals but may in
combination be used to do so. Analysing such data constitutes
a severe impact on the privacy of individuals. It facilitates the
creation of user profiles and social networks as well as tracking of
user activities, performance, and preferences. In order to reduce
that impact, e.g., due to legal obligations, privacy principles for the
purpose of de-identification1 can be applied such as generalisation
and supression [5], permutation and aggregation [6], perturbation [7],
and pseudonymisation [8]. A pseudonym replaces a QID of a subject
in order to prevent or impede its identification, while at the same
time maintains the possibility to re-identify the subject by means
of a certain secret [8]. This provides linkability of individual data
records as well as allows an investigation of incidents with a link
to individuals, which both are vital requirements for applications
such as intrusion detection and prevention. At the same time, it
aims at reducing the impact, which data collection and processing
such as auditing or monitoring has on privacy by means of data
minimization. Therefore, it is a suitable de-identification technique
in the context of event correlation and processing.
However, using pseudonymisation, especially in a distributed
setting, as a technique to provide such a privacy-friendly linkability
of individual data records is not a panacea for absolute data protec-
tion and privacy. Several assumptions have to be made and involved
components have to be trusted. Furthermore, pseudonymisation as
a tool to de-identify data sets bears a heavy legacy. Recent history
has shown, that even properly de-identified data can be re-identified
with the right background knowledge and so a connection between
data set entries and individuals has been re-established in a long list
of examples [3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. These recognitions
strongly indicate that it is inherently impossible to achieve full
de-identification in general and full privacy via pseudonymisation
in specific. If, however, the term privacy is not associated with an
underlying assumption of completeness, but rather is taken in a
sense of reduction and in the best case in a sense of minimisation
of QIDs, as it has been postulated by Sweeney [3] and Ohm [4,
1The often used term of anonymisation is avoided, since its usage is controversial [3, 4,
Kap. II.C.2] and misleading due to the associated expectation of absolute privacy.
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Sect. II.C.2] already, pseudonymisation remains a valid tool to
enhance the privacy of individuals in the context of event and data
processing. Additionally, no other privacy preserving technique
can be applied to data records as easily as pseudonymisation, while
preserving the correctness of the original data. In this regard, it
is necessary to move away from a binary distinction between full
privacy on the one hand and no privacy on the other hand, but
rather define privacy as an increasing or decreasing non-formalised
continuum. In view of these facts, our main contributions can be
summarised as follows:
• The explicit formulation of a system and threat model of event
and data record pseudonymisation and the highlighting of
remaining privacy threats,
• the proposal of privacy protection goals, which do not aim to
achieve full privacy, but rather increase privacy byminimisation
of personal as well as potentially personal data,
• the design and development of a pseudonymisation framework
including technical realisations of all protection goals, and
• a discussion about performance implications and an evaluation
of the framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We provide back-
ground on techniques especially important for our framework in
Sect. 2 as well as on the system and threat model including possible
scenarios of our framwork and derived requirements in Sect. 3. The
threat model motivates the proposal of privacy protection goals and
a discussion on potential conflicts in Sect. 4 including further details
about technical realisations of the privacy protection mechanisms
implemented in our event pseudonymisation framework PEEPLL.
We survey related work in Sect. 5 and conclude in Sect. 6.
2 BACKGROUND
The following sections briefly introduce topics, which are needed as
basic building blocks for the design and implementation of several
parts of the pseudonymisation framework.
2.1 Pseudonymisation
The definition of pseudonymisation used throughout this paper
is based on the definition given by GDPR [1] in Article 4(5):
“pseudonymisation means the processing of personal data in such
a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to
a specific data subject without the use of additional information
[. . . ].” As the definition states, some additional information exists,
e.g., a mapping table or a function, to attribute a pseudonym to the
corresponding identifier, which can be used to revert the process
of pseudonymisation. We call this additional information the
pseudonym lookup table. Without knowledge about the mapping,
a re-identification should be unfeasible without undue effort. The
effectiveness of pseudonymisation is significantly determined by
the decision, which data items constitute QIDs and therefore need
to be covered by pseudonymisation. Note that the process of
determining QIDs is higly application-specific. Note further that
the literature often calls the mapping “link”, which must not be
confused with the term “Linkability” explained in Sect. 3.1.2.
2.2 Hash Functions and HMACs
A hash function is a mapping H from an input of arbitrary length
to an output of fixed length n ∈ N, H : M∗ → Mn , which
is called the hash value or digest of the input. This mapping is
considered unique if the following properties hold: 1) Preimage
resistance: Given the hash value y = H (x), it is infeasible to find
the input x equivalent to invert the hash function H . 2) Second
preimage resistance: Given an input x , it is infeasible to find another
input x ′ , x such that H (x ′) = H (x). 3) Collision resistance: It is
infeasible to find two arbitrary inputs x and x ′ with x , x ′ such
that H (x ′) = H (x). Apart from specialised attacks, which target
the underlying mathematics and constructions of hash functions,
they suffer from simple brute-force attacks. Especially when the
preimage space consist of QIDs, preimage resistance cannot be
provided by hash functions sufficiently [18].
One solution is the enlargement of the preimage space by adding
additional entropy in form of a secret key to the input value. Such
a construction is called a keyed hash function. An HMAC is a
practical realisation of a keyed hash function. As every Message
Authentication Code (MAC), it takes a randomly chosen secret key
k of sufficient length and a messagem of arbitrary length as input,
and outputs Mac(k,m), a so called tag of the message, which is
unforgeable as long as the secret key k is not known [19].
2.3 Bloom Filter
Bloom Filters are used to store and query set member information
in a space-efficient way by applying hash functions. The filter itself
consists of a bit array of fixed lengthm, initially set to all 0’s. Given
r differing hash functions Hi : M∗ → {0, . . . ,m − 1}, i ∈ {1, . . . , r }
mapping inputs to a single bit position in the filter, a new input
can be inserted by computing the r hash values for the input and
setting the bits at these positions to 1. To test for set membership of
an input, the hash values are computed like in the insert step and
the resulting positions are looked up in the filter. If all bits at the r
positions are set to 1, the input is a possible member of the set.
The space efficiency comes at the cost of possible false positives.
If the union of all member hash values leads to a filter, in which
the set bits include all bits of a non-member, the filter would still
indicate the set membership for this non-member. On the other
hand, a filter, where any bit for the hash values of an input is set to
0, definitely states the non-membership of this input [20].
2.4 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer
1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer (OT) refers to a cryptographic
primitive, which is defined as follows: A sender S has N messages
M0, . . . ,MN−1 and a receiver R wants to get the i-th messageMi
without S learning any information about which message is of
interest for R. Additionally, R shall not learn any information
about any other messageMj , Mi than the requested one. A very
basic 1-out-of-N OT protocol based on the computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption has been proposed by Naor and Pinkas [21]
and recently a very efficient one by Chou and Orlandi [22]:
Preliminaries: The protocol uses a hash functionH and a group
Zp of prime order p with д as a generator of that group.
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Initialisation (only once, used for all subsequent transfers): 1)S
randomly chooses a secret y ∈ Zp and computes s = дy and t = sy .
2) S sends s as its public key to R.
Input/Output: R’s input is the index i ∈ {0, . . . ,N −1}, and S’s
input is the messages M0, . . . ,MN−1. At the end of the protocol,
R’s output isMi , while S learns nothing about i .
Key Derivation (for every index of interest for R, even in
parallel): 1) R with input i randomly chooses a secret x ∈ Zp and
computes r = si · дx as well as ki = H (s | |r | |sx ) = H (s | |r | |дy ·x ).2
2) R sends r to S. 3) For all j ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1} S computes
kj = H (s | |r | |ry/t j ) = H (s | |r | |д(y ·i+x )·y/дy ·y ·j ).
Transfer (for every index of interest for R, even in parallel):
1) For all j ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1} S encrypts each Mj by computing
Cj = Enc(kj ,Mj ) and then sends these encryptions (C0, . . . ,CN−1)
to R. 2) R decrypts Ci by computingMi = Dec(ki ,Ci ).
Research on the topic of OT is manifold and fast-paced. There
are many variants and so called extension, which try to further
improve the security or efficiency. See further [23].
2.5 Secure Indexes
Secure Indexes offer the possibility to search for keywords in
encrypted documents by querying specially crafted indexes that
maintain the confidentiality of the indexed keywords [24]. Each
Secure Index is based on a Bloom Filter (see Sect. 2.3), which encodes
the keywords for the corresponding document. Keywords undergo a
two-step encoding before they are inserted in the Bloom Filter. 1) A
concealment of the keyword by applying a pseudo-random function
f to both the keyword w and a secret key K = (k1, . . . ,kr ). The
output x = (x1 = f (w,k1), . . . ,xr = f (w,kr )) is called trapdoor.
2) A personalisation of each trapdoor with the unique document
identifier Did by applying the pseudo-random function f again.
The result y = (y1 = f (x1,Did ), . . . ,yr = f (xr ,Did )) is called a
codeword. Its elements yi are then inserted into the Bloom Filter.
The second step is to achieve different codewords for identical
keywords in different documents, which avoids a cross-document
analysis of common keywords. The Bloom Filter is stored together
with the encrypted document as its Secure Index. To query if a
document contains a given keyword, one calculates the trapdoor
for this keyword, personalises it with the document id, and checks if
the resulting codeword is included in the document’s Bloom Filter.
3 REQUIREMENTS & THREAT MODEL
Before discussing privacy threats and protection goals as well as the
design and implementation of our pseudonymisation framework to
mitigate these threats, the following section introduces principles
and requirements for the pseudonymisation framework and the
underlying system model including the most important basic terms
used throughout the rest of the paper. Consider the following two
scenarios, where pseudonymisation of data records is needed:
Scenario 1 An organisation has deployed a distributed security
incident detection system consisting of several distributed sensors
throughout the whole IT as well as physical infrastructure in order
to monitor user activities from several points of view and to detect
2Prepending the values s and r to the hash function as salt approximates a random
oracle and makes sure that the oracle is local to the protocol session. It further helps
against malleability attacks [22].
intrusion, extrusion, and anomalous activities. All sensor data is
being combined at a central data processing unit, which provides
abilities to analyse and correlate the data. Most importantly, the
data of all sensors has to be archived for a certain amount of time
to allow a thorough investigation in cases of security breaches.
Scenario 2 A consortium of several independent medical insti-
tutions wants to collect and share medical data on specific rare
diseases as well as on their treatment and corresponding results
in order to be able to improve the quality level of treatments
especially where one institution does not get enough data by
itself to achieve statistical relevance. The collection and sharing
is not limited to a closed set of medical data but should be able
to incorporate data from patients’ follow-up examinations over
time. Therefore, the data is only useful for research purposes
when it is not completely de-identified but maintains the ability to
update patients’ medical records from different institutions while
the disease status is monitored and the treatment is adjusted.
3.1 Requirements
The two scenarios highlight the following requirements, which
need to be established in order to protect the privacy of individuals
in the context of data collection and sharing.
3.1.1 Personal Data Minimisation. In both scenarios, the collection,
storage and processing of data records has severe implications
for the privacy of users. To mitigate this effect, the principle of
personal data minimisation should be applied and enforced [25]. “By
ensuring that no, or no unnecessary, data is collected, the possible
privacy impact of a system is limited.” [26]. Effective mechanisms
for personal data minimisation in these scenarios are Select before
you Collect [27], which means the limitation of personal data “to
what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are
processed” [1, Article 5(1)(c)] and Pseudonymisation. Any other
form of de-identification is not an option for both scenarios, because
separate data items, that are collected, might need to be linked to
each other in a way, that allows the attribution to the same subject,
even though it is generally unimportant, which identity is behind
that subject. Additionally, in case of an investigation in Scenario 1
or a new special treatment possibility for a patient in Scenario 2,
the subject might need to be re-identifiable.
3.1.2 Linkability. Monitoring of user, process, and network ac-
tivities as well as collecting medical records have not an end in
themselves, but are rather embedded into a broader evaluation
process such as intrusion or anomaly detection or statistical
analysis. Linkability [8] provides the context to set individual
records in relation and is the basis for correlation and interpretation.
3.1.3 Global Pseudonym Consistency. Both scenarios have the
requirement, that all data records, which concern the same subject,
must be pseudonymised such that linkability wrt. the subject is
maintained regardless of the data source. Otherwise, analysis and
statistics of the collected and correlated data are distorted. Such a
global consistency requires specific information about already used
pseudonyms or a deterministic algorithm.
3.1.4 Pseudo- vs. Truly-random Pseudonyms. There are twoways to
maintain global pseudonym consistency, both resulting in different
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system models. 1) A pseudonymisation component might derive
pseudonyms solely from data records alone and in a deterministic
manner. We call this local deterministic or pseudo-random pseudo-
nymisation. This allows the setup of a simple pseudonymisation
infrastructure, because each pseudonymisation component can
derive pseudonyms for QIDs independently from each other, while
at the same time maintain global pseudonym consistency. However,
Marx et al. [18] demonstrated, that preimage attacks via brute
force to uncover such deterministically derived pseudonyms can
be done with reasonable effort due to fairly low cardinalities of
typical preimage domains, such as QIDs (e.g. IP addresses, e-mail
addresses). Furthermore, the need to re-identify a subject behind a
locally and deterministically derived pseudonym, commands the
creation, protection, and coordination of additional pseudonym
disclosure information. 2) Not susceptible to brute force attacks are
pseudonyms, which are not derived from data records, but which are
chosen truly randomly. To determinewhether a random pseudonym
has already been chosen for a given QID, as it is necessary to
maintain global pseudonym consistency, a global lookup table
between QIDs and the corresponding random pseudonyms has
to be consulted. Re-identification of randomly chosen pseudonyms,
can be done via this lookup table as well.
3.1.5 Component Separation. All information that potentially
threatens the privacy of users is collected decentralised on different
independent data sources in both scenarios. For the deployment
of a proper pseudonymisation process, it makes most sense to
pseudonymise all QIDs independently and as close to the data
sources as possible, meaning a one-to-one relation between a
data source and a pseudonymisation component. Furthermore and
for the sake of personal data minimisation a strict separation of
all components of the pseudonymisation process itself should be
enforced. On the one hand, data leakage due to a compromise of
a pseudonymisation component does not necessarily break the
whole pseudonymisation process, due to a separation of knowledge.
On the other hand, such a separated pseudonymisation allows the
exchange of information between all components taking part in the
pseudonymisation process on a so called need-to-know basis. This
reduces the exchange and processing of personal data as well as
other potentially jeopardising data, such as pseudonym frequencies
and temporal information about appearances of pseudonyms for
distinct data sources, to an absolute minimum.
3.1.6 Out of scope. Several other requirements might be important
for the process of pseudonymisation. However, only those men-
tioned in the previous Sects. have been taken into account for the
design of the proposed pseudonymisation framework. In particular,
the actual process for pseudonym disclosure in order to re-identify
a subject behind a pseudonym is open for future work. Furthermore,
the problem of authenticity wrt. the origin of the data records will
be considered as out of scope. It is up to the pseudonymisation
components to ensure, that the processed information is authentic.
Other requirements might be the unforgeability or integrity of the
pseudonym lookup table, to prevent a malicious altering of the
content of the lookup table, the application of group pseudonyms
and more generally of identical pseudonyms for multiple QIDs,
or the establishment of limited linkability according to a session
Processing Unit
X
X
Data Source
X
X
Data Source
PVault
Depositor Depositor
Figure 1: System Model of the Pseudonymisation
Framework.
concept. All of these have to be established separately, in case they
are mandatory requirements.
3.2 System Model
The identified and discussed requirements result in the following
system model for our pseudonymisation framework PEEPLL (see
Fig. 1): A data source is emitting some representation of an event
or some medical record, which for brevity will be called data
record and which possibly contains personal data of a subject.
A so called Depositor assigned to that data source has the task
to replace a QID of a subject, if present, with a pseudonym. For
that, it extracts QIDs on a single identifier basis one by one,
requests a pseudonym for each QID from a so called Pseudonym
Vault (PVault) and upon receiving a response from the PVault,
replaces the identifier with the pseudonym. The PVault receives
a pseudonym request from a Depositor and might be faced with
two situations. First, there already exists a pseudonym for this
identifier in the pseudonym lookup table, which can be sent back
to the Depositor. And second, there does not exist a pseudonym for
this identifier in the pseudonym lookup table and so a new truly-
random pseudonym must be created and stored in the pseudonym
lookup table together with the corresponding QID by the PVault.
The pseudonymised data record is then sent from the Depositor to
the data collection and correlation unit.
Remarks: The integrity and confidentiality of all communication
is protected. The pseudonymisation process is transparent to the
data sources and the processing unit. The PVault is needed in
order to provide truly-random pseudonyms while at the same time
maintain global pseudonym consistency. Communication for the
pseudonymisation process only is needed between the Depositors
and the PVault, not between the Depositors themselves.3
3.3 Threat Model
PEEPLL does not aim at providing provable privacy against strong
external or internal attackers. In fact, there are several threats,
which directly undermine the privacy protection mechanisms of
PEEPLL, mainly because of their fundamental nature:
3Even though the Depositors provide identical functionality and interact identically
with the PVault, they can not be seen as one logical component, because each Depositor
should be limited to the scope of its data source.
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• A malicious data source can undermine the pseudonymisation
process for all locally processed data records.
• A malicious Depositor can 1) create his own local pseudonym
lookup table containing all locally processed QIDs and pseu-
donyms, as well as 2) ignore pseudonym responses or even
skip requesting pseudonyms from the PVault and use his own
(random or not) pseudonyms.
• A malicious PVault can manipulate the pseudonym lookup of
already processed QIDs as well as manipulate the generation
function and ignore the requirement of random pseudonyms.
Apart from organisational rules and regulations, there are no
protection mechanisms, which could be deployed by PEEPLL in
order to prevent these threats. At most, a weak mitigation against
these fundamental privacy threats can be achieved by a strict
separation of all components and an enforcement to prevent a
collution, since it is limiting their scope to the locally accessible data.
Nonetheless, from a threat model point of view, these components
need to be considered as trusted and a collaboration must be
prohibited. Furthermore, recent publications on re-identification of
de-identified data strongly indicate, that it is inherently impossible
to achieve full privacy via pseudonymisation (see Sect. 1).
However, PEEPLLmoves away from a binary distinction between
full privacy on the one hand and no privacy on the other hand,
but rather sees privacy as well as an opposing threat to privacy
as an increasing or decreasing non-formalised continuum. With
this association of the term privacy, the minimisation of existing
identifying and quasi-identifying features in a system exacerbates
the privacy threats mentioned above and increases the privacy of
individuals. Conversely, the existence of such QIDs including meta
data of a pseudonymisation process itself constitutes a threat to
privacy, since it aids to re-identify individuals. Thus, the main
focus of PEEPLL is the strict minimisation of QIDs, including
meta data of the pseudonymisation process itself, such as re-usage
patterns of pseudonyms. It tries to maintain the information that
really is needed by the data processing unit in order to provide its
functionality as well as the information that really is needed for the
process of pseudonymisation. The remaining sources of potentially
sensitive information shall be eliminated as accurately as possible.
In particular, PEEPLL facilitates the minimisation of the following
data or the prevention of its utilisation:
• Meta information about the usage count of existing pseudonyms
can be inferred by Depositors, which will be prevented by
PEEPLL with specifically designed responses of the PVault so
that Depositors do not learn such information (see Sect. 4.1).
• The PVault has a global view on all cleartext QIDs prevalent
in the whole system. This threat will be addressed in PEEPLL
by protecting the confidentiality of all QIDs with respect to the
PVault (see Sect. 4.2).
• The PVault can infer usage patterns from pseudonym requests
as a form of meta information, which, over time, might provide
the ability to infer additional sensitive information. PEEPLL will
mitigate this threat by limiting the linkability of data records
(see Sect. 4.5) as well as by preventing the PVault from learning
any information about which entry of the pseudonym lookup
table matches a queried deposit (see Sect. 4.3)
• The collection of pseudonymised data records in general
allows the creation of individual profiles over pseudonyms,
which increase in accuracy over time, since all data records
related to the same QID are linkable via the corresponding
pseudonym. Those profiles, even without being directly linkable
to individuals, might on the one hand leak sensitive information
and on the other hand illegally be de-pseudonymised, which
both have an increasing success probability over time. PEEPLL
will mitigate this threat by limiting the linkability of several
related data records (see Sect. 4.5).
4 PEEPLL
Pseudonymisation alone does not protect against tracking, profiling,
and re-identification via background knowledge attacks [28, 29].4
We will consider the following protection goals with respect to
the design and implementation of the proposed pseudonymisation
framework. Each protection goal aims at reducing the impact on
the privacy of individuals. The overall challenge is to preserve the
linkability of certain data records to some specifiable extent.
4.1 Re-use Indistinguishability
Definition 4.1
The information about whether or how often a pseudonym has
been used before by any Depositor is only known to the PVault.
Especially, a Depositor should not be able to distinguish whether
or not a pseudonym has been used before by any other Depositor.
A pre-requisite of this protection goal is the separation of
pseudonym creation from querying existing or new pseudonyms,
which confirms the importance of the distributed environment
already established by the system model. From a technical point
of view to protect the Re-use Indistinguishability, the PVault is
responding to a pseudonym request of a Depositor in such a way,
that both cases, the generation of a new pseudonym and the finding
of a matching entry in the pseudonym lookup table, look identical
and thus are indistinguishable to the Depositor. This approach,
however, is not applicable to every configuration of PEEPLL. See
Sect. 4.3.2 for more details.
4.2 Deposit Confidentiality
Definition 4.2
The QID, which is to be replaced with a pseudonym by a Depositor,
is only known to that Depositor itself. Neither the PVault nor any
other Depositor shall learn any information about the underlying
QID from a pseudonym request or a deposit, except another
Depositor is processing the same QID as well.
PEEPLL utilises HMACs by equipping all Depositors with a
shared secret k not known to the PVault. Given k and a QID,
which is to be pseudonymised, a Depositor converts the plain
QID into a lookup token TQID = Mac(k,QID) calculated by
the tag-generation function of the HMAC. This lookup token
will later be used to recognize a possibly corresponding existing
pseudonym PQID without relying on information about the QID
itself – therefore establishing Deposit Confidentiality. Furthermore,
because all Depositors use the same shared secret k , the lookup
4See also Sect. 1 and Sect. 3.3.
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
PVault
TQID = Mac(k,QID)
(TQID , PQID )
LookupToken
SearchMapping
[UpdateMapping]
Figure 2: Interaction between a Depositor and the PVault
in the HMAC-based approach.
token of QID stays consistent across the whole system, which
preserves the requirement of Global Pseudonym Consistency. The
Depositor sends a pseudonym request containing TQID to the
PVault owning the global pseudonym lookup table PM , which is a
set of pairs of existing lookup tokens and corresponding pseudo-
nyms {(TQID1 , PQID1 ), . . . , (TQIDn , PQIDn )} for already processed
QIDs. The PVault searches PM for a matching entry (TQID , PQID )
of the lookup token and the corresponding pseudonym connected
to QID. In case such a matching pair in PM does not exist yet, the
PVault has to generate a new pseudonym PQID , store it together
with the lookup token in PM and respond the Depositor with PQID .
The Depositor replaces theQID with the received pseudonym PQID
and carries on. Compare Fig. 2.
The secret key, which is shared among all Depositors but not
with the PVault, adds entropy to the hashing process, which is
necessary since the PVault could otherwise easily brute-force the
actual QID (see Sect. 2.2). In PEEPLL it is generated and distributed
to all Depositors once at the very beginning of the deployment.
Such a brute-force attack is still possible, in cases where Depositors
get hold of foreign deposits not related to their currently processed
QID. This can happen when protection mechanisms for Matching
Pseudonym Unobservability (see Sect. 4.3) are deployed as well.
Since all Depositors know the secret key, the additional entropy is
truncated. We refer to this problem asWeak Deposit Confidentiality
and discuss a solution in Sect. 4.4.3.
4.3 Matching Pseudonym Unobservability
Definition 4.3
Which pseudonym from the pseudonym lookup table actually
matches a specific data item requested by a Depositor is only
known to the Depositor itself. In other words, the PVault does not
learn any information about which entry of the pseudonym lookup
table matches a queried deposit.
It does not matter if the QIDs, which need to be pseudonymised,
can be processed as plaintexts or if they need to be concealed
in order to protect the Deposit Confidentiality. Because of this,
in the following, they are denoted as data item E. In its most
simple form, this protection goal can be achieved by sending the
whole pseudonym lookup table to each Depositor who requests a
pseudonym. In this way, the PVault does not learn which entry is
of real interest. However, besides the need of a great amount of
bandwidth, this approach raises two problems.
4.3.1 Privacy Issue. All existing data items as well as their cor-
responding pseudonyms will become known to the requesting
Depositor, which contradicts the principle of Personal Data Min-
imisation and the limitation of the scope of one Depositor. PEEPLL
balances this conflict and additionally saves bandwidth by limiting
the number of returned pseudonym lookup table entries, while at
the same time assures, that this number is truly greater than one.5
A Depositor converts the data item E into a lookup tokenTE and
sends a pseudonym request containingTE to the PVault owning the
global pseudonym lookup table PM . The lookup token creation is
returning a filter or mask, which can be applied to the pseudonym
lookup table PM by the PVault and which matches both the entry
of real interest as well as other irrelevant entries. In particular, the
lookup token TE created by a Depositor for a specific data item E
consists of a Bloom Filter (see Sect. 2.3), which not only contains
the data item E, but also a blinding of b randomly chosen bits.
The blinding accomplishes an artificial false positive rate, which
influences the probability, that more than one entry matches a
given lookup token, while searching the pseudonym lookup table
PM . The false positive rate can be controlled via the number of
blinding bits b (see Sect. 4.4.2). The PVault applies the lookup token
to PM and returns a set of all matching pairs of pseudonyms and
the corresponding data items. The Depositor itself searches the set
for a matching pair (Ej , PEj ), where Ej = E, replaces the data item
E with the pseudonym PEj and carries on.
4.3.2 New Data Item Issue. The second problem relates to the case
of a new data item of real interest, which does not exist in the
pseudonym lookup table yet. In this case, the returned set only
contains irrelevant entries, which will and must be sorted out by
the Depositor. Eventually, the Depositor has to request the creation
of a new pseudonym from the PVault, thereby thwarting Re-use
Indistinguishability and also Matching Pseudonym Unobservability,
since the creation request unambiguously references the data item
of real interest. This can only partially be fixed by forcing the
creation of dummy pseudonyms. After each pseudonym request and
its corresponding response, the Depositor must send a pseudonym
creation request, which either contains the data item of real interest,
when only irrelevant pseudonym lookup table entries have been
sent back from the PVault, or which contains a dummy data item
otherwise. Re-use Indistinguishabilitywill still be violated, since the
Depositor can distinguish meaningful from irrelevant responses.
This problem remains open for future work.
5It must be highlighted, that this approach achievesMatching Pseudonym Unobservabi-
lity, but does not achieve Deposit Confidentiality, even when the confidentiality of data
items is protected by the approach explained in Sect. 4.2, since a Depositor getting
hold of foreign deposits is able to brute-force the HMACs. For a solution of this Weak
Deposit Confidentiality see Sect. 4.4.3
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Figure 3: Interaction between a Depositor and the PVault
in the Secure-Index--based approach.
4.4 Combined Deposit Confidentiality and
Matching Pseudonym Unobservability
In order to protect both the Deposit Confidentiality and Matching
Pseudonym Unobservability simultaneously, the concept of 1-out-
of-N OT (see Sect. 2.4) in conjunction with HMACs as utilised in
Sect. 4.2 seems to be a natural solution. However, OT is not easily
applicable to our context for two reasons. First, it assumes, that the
database is of fixed length and its entries can be accessed by specific
indices known to the Depositor. But the pseudonym lookup table
of the PVault is constantly changing and its entries as well as their
indices are not known to the Depositor. Second, OT involves heavy
computation or heavy communication or both. At the end of the
OT protocol, the sender delivers the whole database (specifically
encrypted) to the receiver, which is not suitable to our setting. For
this reason, the mechanisms explained in Sect. 4.2 and Sect. 4.3 are
combined in PEEPLL as an alternative to OT. Additionally, certain
optimisations are applied, which provide a more tailored solution
and which closely relate to the concept of Secure Indexes (see
Sect. 2.5). The concept of OT still does provide a viable solution to
the problem of Weak Deposit Confidentiality, so its application in
PEEPLL is discussed in Sect. 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Secure Indexes paired with HMACs. Given the shared secret
k , a Depositor creates a Bloom Filter as lookup token TQID =
BF (k,QID) for the data item QID. The Bloom Filter is constructed
by deriving a set of r secret keys (k1, · · · ,kr ) from k , randomly
picking a subset of r/2 keys and repeatedly applying a pseudo-
random function to the QID for each ki in the subset, determining
which bits in the Bloom Filter are set (see Sect. 2.3). Using only
half of the keys during lookup introduces an indeterminism
to mitigate query profiling as discussed by Goh [24] (compare
Sect. 4.4.2). The lookup token then is sent to the PVault, who
owns the pseudonym lookup table PM , which is a set of triples
each consisting of a Bloom Filter, a HMAC, and a corresponding
pseudonym for already processed QIDs. The PVault returns a set
{(HMACQID j , PQID j ) | (BFQID j ,HMACQID j , PQID j ) ∈ PM ∧
TQID ⊂ BFQID j } of all pairs of HMACs and pseudonyms whose
respective Bloom Filter is a superset ofTQID . The expected number
of elements of the set is influenced by the false positive rate
introduced by the blinding injected into the Bloom Filters of the
pseudonym lookup table (see Sect. 4.4.2).
In order for a Depositor to recognize the proper pseudonym
in the received result set, the locally computed HMACQID =
Mac(k,QID) is compared to the received HMACs . If no match is
found, the Depositor takes the HMACQID and creates a Bloom
Filter similar to the one created as lookup token with the exception
that all r keys are used instead of a subset, and adds a blinding of
b bits to the Bloom Filter by setting b randomly chosen bits to 1.
The blinding accomplishes an artificial false positive rate, which
influences the probability, that more than one triple matches a given
lookup token while searching the pseudonym lookup table PM . The
false positive rate can be controlled via the number b of blinded bits.
The result is a pair (HMACQID ,BFQID ) of the HMAC and Bloom
Filter, which correspond to theQID. This is sent to the PVault, who
updates the PM with the resulting pair BFQID ,HMACQID and a
newly generated pseudonym PQID , which is finally returned to the
Depositor. This interaction is shown in Fig. 3.
Note: The presented approach protects Re-use Indistinguishabil-
ity and Matching Pseudonym Unobservability only in those cases,
where the Depositor finds a matching HMAC in the result set from
the PVault. For further details, see Sect. 4.3.2.
4.4.2 False Positive Rates. Given an observed event rate r , the
defined retention period p and an aspired false positive rate f p, the
number of unique words can be approximated as n = r ∗p ∗c , where
c is a constant to account for the expected number of identifiers per
event. According toGoh [24], Bloom Filters should be parameterized
with a number of hash functions k = − log2 f p and a Bloom Filter
size ofm = n∗k/ln 2.
Since we employ Goh’s extension proposal for a heuristic, that
obfuscates query duplicates by sending only a partial trapdoor, the
effective false positive rate is elevated. Instead of using the full
trapdoor of length k , a random sample of size k ′ = k/2 is drawn
from the full trapdoor. Consequently, the resulting false positive rate
is given as f p′ = 2−k ′ = 2−k/2 =
√
2−k =
√
f p. To compensate for
the effect of partial trapdoor building on the effective false positive
rate, the number of hash functions is chosen as k∗ = −2 log2 f p,
where f p is the desired false positive rate.
We have measured this relation in the deployed implementation
displayed in Fig. 4. It shows the average number of deposits with
matching Bloom Filters dependent on the false positive rate f p′ for
a fixed number of pre-added deposits. Obviously our approach can
only give probabilistic guarantees for the number of false positives
and as a consequence of this for the protection goal of Matching
Pseudonym Unobservability.
4.4.3 Solving Weak Deposit Confidentiality. The presented ap-
proach still raises a special challenge. The entries of the pseudonym
lookup table consist of pairs of confidential QIDs and corresponding
pseudonyms, with the mandatory requirement, that the technical
realisation to protect the Deposit Confidentiality is of deterministic
E. Zimmer et al.
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Figure 4: Average number of matching Bloom Filters
dependent on the false positive rate measured by adding
deposits to a prefilled PVault (100 records).
nature. This determinism assures, that a QID always results in the
same concealed data item (the HMAC of a QID), which is sent to
the PVault as a pseudonym request and stored in the pseudonym
lookup table for future reference. This determinism additionally
assures, that a Depositor, who receives a set of deposits as a response
to its pseudonym request, which potentially contains deposits
from earlier pseudonym requests as well as from other Depositors,
and which should remain confidential even to this Depositor (see
Definition 4.2), is able to recognise the one deposit, which matches
the actual QID of real interest. However, this determinism makes
all deposits, or more precisely their HMACs, that are returned to
the Depositor, susceptible to brute-force attacks by that Depositor,
because the additional entropy added to the HMACs is known to
the Depositor and so is useless as protection mechanism against an
enumeration of all possible QIDs. As a result, the deposits, which
are to be sent to the Depositor as a response to a pseudonym request,
have to be processed in a way, that conceals all deposits except the
one of real interest for the Depositor, before leaving the PVault.
A perfectly valid solution is the application of 1-out-of-N OT
as explained in Sect. 2.4 with some adjustments to overcome its
two major obstacles for our setting. 1) The first obstacle concerns
the missing fixed indices, which would need to be used to pinpoint
a specific entry of the pseudonym lookup table on the side of a
Depositor playing the receiver of the OT protocol. A resolution
is the utilisation of the HMACs themselves, which are part of
the lookup tokens, as keys or indices of a hash map storing the
corresponding entries of the pseudonym lookup table. As this
again would deliver the HMACs of foreign deposits to a Depositor,
who can easily brute-force them, the HMACs as indices of the
hash map are hashed a second time together with the OT specific
entry key formerly denoted as kj for all j ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}
with N being the number of all entries: OT -INDEXQID j =
Mac(kj ,HMACQID j ). The Depositor who requests the pseudonym
for a specific QID can calculate the OT-key kQID , which is used to
decrypt the requested deposit out of the received set of encrypted
deposits. This OT-key also allows the Depositor to compute the
correctOT -INDEXQID and so identify the requested deposit in the
received set. 2) The second obstacle concerns the computational
as well as the communication overhead introduced by the OT
protocol. This obstacle can at least be mitigated by not using the
whole pseudonym lookup table as input for the sender (PVault), but
limiting the number of inputs to the ones requested by the Depositor
via the Bloom Filter. This denotes a trade-off between achievable
security of OT and the performance of the pseudonymisation
framework.
4.5 Limited Linkability
Definition 4.4
The linkability of data records concerning the same QID should
only be maintained for a specified and limited period.
Limiting the linkability constitutes a trade-off between the
requirements of Personal Data Minimisation and Linkability. This
trade-off has to be optimised by adjusting variables to control the
limitation, which is a highly application-specific process. Technical
mechanisms to achieve Limited Linkability are realised in PEEPLL
by limiting the time period in which reuses are possible as well as
by limiting the re-uses.
4.5.1 Temporal Limitation by Global Epochs. Temporally limiting
the linkability of pseudonyms is realised in PEEPLL by introducing
epochs, at whose beginning all pseudonyms are changed. The
PVault is enforcing the limitation by simply deleting the exist-
ing pseudonym lookup table. On the Depositor’s side, temporal
limitation is achieved by combining theQID with an epoch specific
tag ti in a way, that the PVault cannot link lookups for QID ◦ ti
and QID ◦ tj , where i , j, to the same QID. For that, PEEPLL
utilises HMACs in the same way as they are use in order to achieve
Deposit Confidentiality. The epoch specific tag ti for epoch i is
deterministically derived from the secret key k that is shared among
all Depositors as a master secret. Given this epoch tag and a QID,
which is to be pseudonymised, the combination QID ◦ ti is derived
by converting the plain data item into a lookup token TQIDti =
Mac(ti ,QID). A major advantage of this approach is the possibility,
that it can be enforced by both the Depositor and the PVault in
such a way that no re-usage is possible beyond limitation if at least
one party complies. We will refer to this two-sided enforcement as
anytrust.
4.5.2 Budget Limitation. By limiting the linkability of data records
by a budget, it is not possible to re-use a pre-existing pseudonym
mapping after the budget sum of prior re-uses has exceeded the
maximum privacy budget. The individual budgets are either simply
1 or a weight that is sensitive to the context and the impact of a
pseudonym re-use on the privacy of a subject. In its most simple
form, the privacy budget accumulates the number of re-uses of
a pseudonym. Such an approach can be achieved by introducing
usage counters for each pseudonym on the PVault. If the counter
for a pseudonym exceeds the upper bound, the existing entry in the
pseudonym lookup table is deleted or hidden, which triggers the
creation of a new pseudonym for this QID on its next request. In
order to prevent the revelation of the actually matching pseudonym
by the budget accounting to the PVault when enforcing Matching
Pseudonym Unobservability, the costs for the current request is
added to all pseudonyms that match the lookup including the
irrelevantmatches. As a consequence, the budget counter associated
to a pseudonym on the PVault would only be a fuzzy account and
an upper bound of its actual budget.
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4.6 Achievable Protection Goals
In the preceding section, we have introduced technical means
for several of our protection goals, namely Re-use Indistinguisha-
bility, Deposit Confidentiality, Matching Pseudonym Unobservabi-
lity, Combined Deposit Confidentiality and Matching Pseudonym
Unobservability as well as Limited Linkability. However, some of
these technical means lead to violations of other protection goals.
Especially, our approaches for achieving Matching Pseudonym
Unobservability are built in such a way that the protection goal of
Re-use Indistinguishability is not achieved. Finding solutions which
accomplish these combinations of protection goals should be seen
as an open challenge.
5 RELATEDWORK
The concept of pseudonymisation and Limited Linkability of
pseudonymous data has attracted some interest in concrete research
fields, especially vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) and mobile
communication.
Petit et al. [30] survey different strategies for pseudonym
creation in VANETs and highlight changing pseudonyms as a vital
requirement in the lifecycle of a pseudonym. The risk of enabling
an attacker to create mobility patterns of drivers has to be balanced
with the linkability required for operational tasks like collision
detection. However, in opposition to VANETs, where one vehicle
uses a pseudonym, our scenario has the requirement of Global
Pseudonym Consistency for data receiving different pseudonyms
coming from different data sources, so that the given strategies are
not applicable.
Arapinis et al. [31] examine the handling of pseudonym updates
in mobile communication networks, namely the strategy of real-
locating temporary identifiers (TMSI) in the 3GPP standard. They
find that current implementations of the standard miss reasonable
reallocation strategies and therefor enable user tracking for long
time periods over different areas and independent of the amount of
user activity. We try to prevent similar tracking approaches in our
scenario by limiting the linkability as given in Sect. 4.5.
Recently Florian et al. [32] proposed a pseudonymisation and
pseudonym change approach utilizing the blockchain technique
to achieve a complete decentralisation and resistance against sybil
attacks. While this approach is of interest for pseudonymous
authentication challenges, e.g. in the vehicular communication, it
is not suitable for our scenario of multiple data sources requesting
pseudonyms for different data items.
In intrusion detection research pseudonymisation has been
widely examined to balance automatic anomaly detection require-
ments with privacy requirements.
In 1997, Sobirey et al. [33] discussed the impact, which the
collection and analysis of audit events might have on users’ privacy
and presented pseudonymisation as a viable way to protect the
privacy interests of employees and users of computer systems in
general against the upcoming trend of automatic intrusion detection
and operating system auditing. They describe the distributed intru-
sion detection system AID which uses deterministic encryption
to provide consistent pseudonyms for different agents in their
system. However, they do not discuss the consequences of Global
Pseudonym Consistency in a distributed system as well as issues
with Limited Linkability.
Büschkes and Kesdogan [34] describe the conflicting interests of
an IDS operator and the monitored users in detail. They demand the
concepts of data avoidance and data minimization. They propose a
pseudonym-based solution, which requires a central trusted third
party knowing the user identities for pseudonym generation. To
minimize the impact of user profiling they introduce the concept
of group reference pseudonyms referencing user groups instead of
single users. Our approach uses Component Separation to prevent
the central component from learning user identities.
Biskup and Flegel [35, 36] substitute identifying features in audit
event messages with transaction pseudonyms, which are derived
via Shamir’s secret sharing from a longer-living pseudonym. If the
number of audit events concerning the same identity, i.e. the number
of issued secret shares, exceeds a defined threshold, an auditor can
recover the pseudonym from the observed shares. The correlation of
pseudonyms generated by different pseudonymisation components,
as we try to achieve with PEEPLL, is stated as an open issue.
6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper works out sustained privacy threats to the pseudonym-
isation of data records due to the existence of identifying and quasi-
identifying data as well as meta data of the pseudonymisation
process itself, proposes four privacy protection goals, and presents
privacy enhancements for the application of pseudonymisation
of data records in form of a framework. We first provided the
motivation based on two real-world scenarios, where identifying
and quasi-identifying material needs to be processed and the
privacy of the affected subjects can be restored by utilising
pseudonymisation. Based on these scenarios, we identified three
important requirements for our event pseudonymisation, namely
Global Pseudonym Consistency, Component Separation, as well as
Linkability, and formalised our setting with a concrete system and
threat model in Sect. 3. This includes an explanation of operational
limits to the achievable level of privacy by event pseudonymisation,
which lead to the formulation of the four privacy protection
goals Re-use Indistinguishability, Deposit Confidentiality, Matching
Pseudonym Unobservability, and Limited Linkability in Sect. 4. An
important observation is the sometimes contrary nature of these
protection goals and the resulting conflicts and obstacles, which
arise when two or more of these protection goals shall be achieved.
For each protection goal, the technical realisation in PEEPLL as
well as potential performance consequences were explained as well.
Assuming all components of our framework act compliantly to
their protocol (honest-but-curious), the framework provides the
following properties:
• Pseudonymisation with Global Pseudonym Consistency,
• Enforcing Limited Linkability (temporal and budget)
• Protection of Deposit Confidentiality,
• Protection of Matching Pseudonym Unobservability
• Protection of Re-use Indistinguishability, but only in combina-
tion withDeposit Confidentiality, not withMatching Pseudonym
Unobservability.
Practical scenarios for the application of our framework are not
limited to the ones mentioned in Sect. 3, but those were the focus of
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our development. PEEPLL will be applied to those scenarios in the
context of two of our research projects, where the requirement of
data analysis and monitoring meets strict privacy regulations. The
first context is the privacy respecting detection and prevention of
insider attacks, which embraces extensive monitoring of employee
activities and so attacks from one of the pseudonymisation compo-
nents themself (PVault, Depositors) have to be taken into account.
The second context is the collection and processing of medical
patient data, which deals with highly privacy relevant records on
the one hand, and the need to analyse detailed information from
patients’ disease processes on the other hand.
Future workwill be conducted on the integration of a pseudonym
re-identification (pseudonym disclosure) process and potential
side effects on the achievement of the privacy protection goals.
Further aspects comprise the Weak Deposit Confidentiality, the
enforcement of anytrust in the context of Budget Limitation, and
the simultaneous protection of Re-use Indistinguishability and
Matching Pseudonym Unobservability.
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